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The article casts a critical retrospective glance over Catford's influential contribution to Translation Studies. Some of the strengths and weaknesses of tying a translation theory to a linguistic theory are discussed, together with the problems of building a deductive theory relying mainly on invented examples. Catford's evident interest in machine translation is noted, and also his incorporation of pragmatic aspects such as relevance. The distinction drawn between equivalence and correspondence is theoretically important, and his analysis of translation shifts has been highly influential on later work. His definition of translation as textual replacement rather then meaning transfer, and his language-bound concept of meaning itself, have been much debated.


J. C. Catford has had a bad press in Translation Studies. However, Lauri Carlson once told me he thought Catford was unduly neglected by contemporary translation scholars – hence my choice of topic for this volume.
Catford’s classic A Linguistic Theory of Translation was published nearly half a century ago (1965). Its sub-heading is “An Essay in Applied Linguistics”, and it was based on a series of lectures at the Edinburgh University School of Applied Linguistics. Translation was only one of Catford’s interests: he was also a phonetician and a general linguist. In standard introductions or surveys of Translation Studies, the book is indeed classified as a linguistic theory, and the implication is usually that it somehow belongs to ancient history, long before such major developments as Skopos Theory or the Cultural Turn. In a survey of linguistic approaches to translation, Fawcett (1997: 56) dismisses Catford’s contribution as “disappointing”. Munday (2001) outlines Catford’s classification of shifts, but does not seem too impressed. Snell-Hornby, in her own history of Translation Studies (2006), gives Catford no more than a single sentence, which surprisingly appears to take him as a representative of generative grammar. A Meta review nearly twenty years after the book’s publication is also disappointed in the book’s lack of relevance to the normal practice of translation, and regards it as being of “historical academic interest only” (Henry 1984: 57).
Are these dismissive reactions justified? Perhaps we can now see more in Catford than meets the eye? What kind of conversation might one have with him today, in the light of how translation theory has developed over the past decades?
1. The nature of the theory
Catford establishes his theory of translation within a specific general theory of linguistics: an early version of Halliday’s systemic grammar (set out e.g. in Halliday 1961), itself much influenced by Firth. Halliday’s framework is taken mostly as given, with only a few minor modifications. The advantage of this is that Catford’s translation theory is firmly anchored in a more general theoretical context, and is largely consistent. Catford assumes that a theory of translation has to do with a kind of relation between languages, and is consequently a branch of Comparative Linguistics. This warns us that much of his theory may turn out to be more relevant to Contrastive Analysis than to translation in the normal sense of the word. Relations between languages, however, are said to be not always symmetrical (20): this is of course true of translation, but would not apply to non-directional (e.g. semantically based) Contrastive Analysis. We should recall, too, the linguistic context of the 1960s, and the attempts at that time to be more “objective” about language and meaning.
Logically enough, the presentation starts with a definition of translation, and then outlines a typology. Catford’s definition, which has become famous, is: “Translation [is] the replacement of textual material in one language (SL) by equivalent textual material in another language (TL)” (20). At this point, he picks out two of this definition’s central terms for comment: ‘textual material’ and ‘equivalent’. (Curiously, he does not take up the term ‘replacement’ here, which will be crucial to him.) Defending his use of ‘textual material’ (rather than ‘text’), he says that this term “underlines the fact that in normal terms it is not the entirety of a SL text which is translated, that is, replaced by TL equivalents” (20, emphasis original). This is because normally there is no replacement of SL graphology by equivalent TL graphology. 
This argument, which surfaces at several points, raises a problem. It is only because the underlying linguistic theory sets up graphological (and phonological) levels alongside those of grammar and lexis, that Catford has to say that normally “it is not the entirety of a SL text which is translated”. This claim is not justified by reasons internal to translation practice, and thus seems to introduce unecessary distance between the theory and its object. Catford’s point here also illustrates his top-down method of arguing, deductive rather than inductive. This is shown most strikingly in his initial typology of translation, which immediately follows his definition.
On the one hand, one would like to applaud Catford for setting up a typology that is explicitly justified by the underlying theory with its categories of levels and ranks. On the other hand his proposed typology seem curiously artificial when set against translation practice, as critics have pointed out. His main categories are: full vs partial, and total vs restricted. The first distinction relates to the extent of the translation: for Catford a ‘text’ can be anything from a morpheme to a complete library, apparently (21); so you can either translate all or some of a text, perhaps leaving some items untranslated. The second distinction relates to the linguistic levels involved. ‘Total’ translation means replacing all the levels (grammar, lexis, phonology, graphology); but replacements of these latter two levels are not “equivalent”. Restricted translation then relates to only one level, for example phonological translation. Further distinctions concern translation at different ranks (clause, group etc.).
As far as I know, the concepts and terms of this typology have not been adopted in later work in the field of Translation Studies. They have not been seen to be pragmatically useful, and in this respect Catford’s theory has failed to “catch on”. Scholars may also have been less than convinced by Catford’s assumption that there is an important distinction to be made between (a) replacing SL textual material with equivalent TL material, and (b) replacing it with non-equivalent material. The first is the definition of translation itself, and the second is part of the definition of “total” translation (since the replacing graphology and phonology are not normally “equivalent”). It appears from this typology that Catford’s translation theory sets out to be so general that the normal everyday world of actual translation is only represented in one small corner of the object to be described. “Total translation” is “what is most usually meant by ‘translation’” (22), but it is given rather less space in Catford’s presentation than his other types and subtypes. “Lexical” and “grammatical translation” would nowadays be treated as kinds of code-switching.
2. Equivalence and correspondence
In distinguishing between empirically observed textual equivalence and formal correspondence, Catford makes an important point that has been reflected in much later work. A textual equivalent, he says (27), is “any TL text or portion of text which is observed on a particular occasion […] to be the equivalent of a given SL text or portion of text”. This formulation may remind later scholars of Toury’s argument that a translation is any TL text that is accepted as conforming to TL norms about what a translation is supposed to be (e.g. 1995). Toury’s argument has been criticized as circular, but his point was that any definition of translation is culture-bound. For Catford, what is or is not equivalent is bound to the view of an observer. This observer is a “competent bilingual or translator” (27). So a text is equivalent if a competent translator says it is: this is precisely the argument proposed by Pym several decades years later (e.g. 2004). Equivalence is produced by translators, and then implicitly claimed by them, a claim that is (or is not) then accepted by the client and later readers. Catford appears to regard this claim as being dependent on the subjective opinion of a competent translator, rather than on the shared opinion of a community, or on norms; and this ultimately makes his approach more subjective than he may have realized. A single translator appears to be enough. Commutation can also be used to establish what is equivalent: change something in the source, and see what changes in the translation as a result. (Recall Toury’s “replacing” and “replaced” segments!) But these changes are also made by the competent bilingual translators, of course (among whom the scholar may include himself, as Catford implicitly does with the examples he cites).
There are, of course, problems here. One is Catford’s apparent assumption that these competent translators will agree on what is or is not equivalent, together with the implied assumption that there is, in a given context, just one equivalent. As we know, such agreement is a matter of degree; this means that judgements about equivalence must also be matters of degree, depending on who is judging, on the context, the purpose of the assessment, and so on. Catford appears here to be relying on something like Chomsky’s infamous community of homogeneous native speakers. An associated problem is how to decide who is, or is not, a competent bilingual or translator in the first place, as if this were a clear-cut category. – All in all, it seems that Catford is pitching his argument more at an abstract, philosphical level than an empirical one here.
Statements about specific textual equivalents can be formulated in terms of unconditioned, and then conditioned, equivalence probabilities, which in turn lead to the possibility of translation rules or “algorithms” (31). In this way, Catford looks explicitly in the direction of machine translation.
The importance given to formal correspondence underlines the relevance of Catford’s theory for Contrastive Analysis. Formal correspondence can only be relative, to be sure. However, it also relies on textual equivalence, since otherwise there would appear to be no motivation to want to state a formal correspondence between two text segments in the first place (32), unless the research context is one of language typology. There thus remains a tension in Catford’s theory between a translational view (based on equivalence) and a contrastive view. The contrastive view is reinforced by the focus on relations between languages (or systems, such as those of prepositions or articles). Catford is indeed concerned with langue rather than parole, but this tension is also visible in the way he occasionally frames his analysis in terms of utterances (e.g. 37, 39) and even speech acts (e.g. 52). (Austin’s How to Do Things with Words had appeared a few years earlier, in 1962.)
In hindsight, one can see that Catford’s formal correspondence, when applied to texts rather than languages, lives on in Translation Studies as a version of Nida’s formal equivalence. It also provides a theoretical justification for what is perhaps the most frequently cited part of Catford’s approach, his analysis of translation shifts, defined as “departures from formal correspondence” (73). But there is very little in Catford that would match the notion of dynamic equivalence. There is a chapter on language varieties in translation, which makes use of early Hallidayan categories of register etc. However, explicit mentions of the notion of function are rare, although context, situation and culture are recognized to be important.
3. Assumptions about meaning
Catford’s assumption that meaning is language-specific, and thus cannot be “transferred” from one language to another, derives from his adoption of Firth’s anti-mentalist theory of language and meaning (see e.g. Firth 1957). Meaning is understood as “the total network of relations entered into by any linguistic form” (35), a view that is simply taken for granted, not argued for. No account of taken of any alternative view, for instance of the notion that meanings are universal and objectively “there”, or that meanings are not language-specific but speaker- and/or hearer-specific, or situation-specific. Or that some meanings might be more language-specific than others (although this is perhaps implied by some of the points made later about translatability).
This assumption means that Catford must disregard not only the widespread folk understanding that translators “transfer meaning”, but also the very etymology of the word “translation” itself, and that of its many cognates in other languages. However, it is easy for him to show that perfectly acceptable translations do not necessarily have absolutely the same meaning. (An alternative approach would have been to argue that meaning is transferred, but not entirely – that translation is largely a matter of metonymy, not metaphor, as argued later e.g. by Tymoczko 1999: 54–55, 279.) But Catford is tied to his parent theory, chooses not to challenge it and accepts the consequences. One consequence is that a new concept and term – transference – must be introduced to account for cases that we might now call the strategy of translating by using a loanword (as when an English translation of a Finnish text contains the word ‘sauna’). True, the English item probably does not carry quite the same contextual meaning as the Finnish, so Catford can maintain his claim that meaning is not transferred. But against this one could argue, from the viewpoint of a different theory of meaning, that some meaning has been transferred. Meaning, for Catford, often seems to be a black-and-white affair.
In translation, says Catford, conditions of translation equivalence are met if the target text expresses the relevant features of “situational substance” that are expressed by the source. This condition of relevance comes as a vital additional requirement to his first statement, which only stipulates that the two texts must share “(at least some of) the same features of [situational] substance” (50). This inclusion of the relevance requirement is the closest Catford gets to bringing in any pragmatic dimension into his theory. “Sameness of situation” is of course problematic, and is accordingly relativized (52).
At this point we see again a disadvantage of being chained to a cover-theory. Catford proceeds to argue that, because of the status of different “substances” (phonic, graphic, situational) in the theory, and because of the way he has defined translation equivalence, there can therefore be no “translation” for instance between the phonic and the graphic, because they are different substances. So he is forced to say that when an oral utterance is replaced by a written one, say in a subtitle, it is not the case that a phonological item has been “translated” by a graphological one. The “translation” comes about only because both items are exponents of a grammatical category that in turn has a contextual meaning that relates to a shared feature of situation-substance. The conclusion follows from the premises, but is so counter-intuitive that one wonders why the premises are not questioned. One could surely do with Occam’s Razor here.
In defence of Catford’s reliance on a general theory of grammar, it could be argued that he is aiming more to increase the coverage of this theory itself, by showing its relevance to translation, than to develop a specific theory of translation. But I think this argument would still be susceptible to the problems touched on above, which raise doubts about the applicability of the general theory to empirical human translation.
The final chapter on the limits of translatability returns to the notion of relevance. Translatability is, of course, a cline, and the position of a given translation task on this cline will depend primarily on the extent to which linguistically relevant features of the source text are bound to the source language itself, and to which extent these features are functionally relevant, as in the case of puns. This is linguistic untranslatability. Cultural translatability, on the other hand (e.g. the strange notion of a sauna in English), is less “absolute”. If one tried to translate ‘sauna’ into English e.g. as ‘bathroom’, this would give rise to curious collocations of bathrooms and birch twigs etc., which leads Catford to conclude that perhaps cultural untranslatabilites are ultimately reducible to collocational ones, and collocations are part of linguistics, so all can be covered by a grand linguistic theory. And this in turn would be good news for machine translation…
4. Use of examples
In hindsight, one of the strangest aspects of Catford’s book is his use of examples. They are taken from a wide range of languages, but almost every example is invented and given outside any context. So we have for instance “The/A woman came out of the house” in English and Russian, to show different ways of expressing definiteness – Russian uses word order (28); terms for different sibling relations in English and Burushaski (40); or an Anglo-Yiddish joke (for which he thanks his wife) to illustrate the importance of the Yiddish rise-fall tone ^, which I cite in full (54).
Judge: Did you steal a horse?
Interpreter: Hot ir gestolen a pferd?
Accused: Ikh hob gestolen a ^pferd?
Judge: What did he say?
Interpreter: He said ‘I stole a horse’.

There are two exceptions. On pages 30 and 33 mention is made of a French short story and its translation, which are used as a source of data on the frequencies of different translations of French dans and other prepositions. This is a literary text, about 12,000 words long. No source is given. And on page 102 we are surprised to find mention of a “genuine” translation from French, one sentence long, and again from a literary work. Literary works might be assumed to have an obvious, albeit vague skopos (purpose); but none of the other examples in the book are contextualized in any way. In a book purporting to be a theory of translation, this is curious. The only translator assumed to be responsible for the other examples is Catford himself, as a linguist with a good knowledge of at least French, and evidently a scholar’s familiarity with aspects of some less-known languages.
I mention this not in criticism of the theoretical ideas themselves (some of which can be criticized on other grounds, as I have indicated), but because of how this use of empirical data relates to Catford’s own assumptions about what a theory is. In the Preface, he writes: “The present volume [is primarily concerned] with the analysis of what translation is. It proposes general categories to which we can assign our observations of particular instances of translation, and it shows how these categories relate to one another” (vii, emphasis original). That is, the aim is a descriptive theory, consisting of general categories that are related in ways that are motivated by the theory. The categories are thus theory-driven, they are ready boxes into which our various empirical observations can be placed; but they do not derive initially from the empirical observations themselves. Re-reading the book, the categories occasionally remind me of a Procrustean bed, to the dimensions of which all data must be persuaded to fit. If one then mostly invents one’s own data, this task is easier. The examples selected become illustrations of the possibility of a given category, but no more than that. They do not substantiate claims that a given category is well-motivated, or prototypical, or notably more significant than some other category.
5. What do we conclude?
One of the striking features of Catford’s theory is its degree of consistency, despite the occasional tension between translational and contrastive approaches. Given a particular underlying linguistic theory, the translation theory is logically derived from it, step by step. I was reminded of the similarly top-down approach taken by Skopos Theory (e.g. in Reiß and Vermeer 1984), starting with a series of axioms and deriving more detailed statements from them, although Skopos Theory wavers between descriptive and prescriptive attitudes. Catford is more consistent, keeping to a descriptive line throughout. He has a liking for taxonomies, and is prepared to follow the logic of his categorizations even if they lead him some distance from the primary contours of the actual object of research. Catford is indeed outlining a general theory of translation, one that will cover all types of translation; but throughout the book there is an emphasis on subtypes such as graphological and phonological translations and transliterations which are certainly not central to ordinary practice, and have been virtually neglected by subsequent work in the field. 
There is no attempt to be prescriptive. But there is no attempt at explanation, either, which makes the theory somewhat superficial. No extra-theoretical motivation of categories is given, for instance. No testable generalizations are proposed, no hypotheses generated.
The reliance on a particular linguistic theory, and moreover on a particular (early) stage of that theory, is problematic. As the linguistic theory develops, the translation theory becomes dated. In Halliday’s later versions of systemic grammar, for instance, the lexical and grammatical levels merge into lexicogrammar (see e.g. Halliday 1985 and later works), but this is obviously not reflected in changes in Catford’s translation theory. Other ways of analysing language varieties are similarly left out of consideration, as are later developments that give more weight to pragmatic considerations (such as communicative functions). In this latter respect too, Catford’s theory is a child of the 1960s. More generally, we see the risk of setting up any translation theory that is not independent and autonomous, based on its own concepts and terms. (There are of course valid reasons for seeking to embed a theory of translation in a more general theory of language, or of communication, as suggested also by Gutt (1990). But that would be a separate topic of discussion.)
In hindsight, again, it seems clear that Catford had one eye on developments in machine translation and the future of computers. His notion of conditioned translation rules have the general form “X is translated as Y, under conditions ABC, with probability P” (my summary of Catford’s argument on pp. 30–31). Early machine translation programs operated on just such rules. Translation scholars today may also be reminded of the form of Toury’s (1995) “laws” of translation (not concerning the translation of given source-text items, but aiming to capture more general characteristics of the translation process). Toury’s laws of interference and increased standardization are similarly conditioned, and similarly probabilistic.
Catford’s final comment on cultural untranslatability  – that if this can ultimately be described in terms of linguistic untranslatability, this would give translation theory more power and also broaden the horizon of machine translation – might even be seen as one of the seeds of the contemporary attempts to set up a semantic web.
His legacy surely includes other seeds too, and not only the shifts idea. Despite his 1960s linguistic framework, he does see the importance of relevance, situation and context; the distinction between formal correspondence and textual equivalence is fundamental (although not exclusive to him), as is the contextualizing of the notion of equivalence itself. While his non-use of empirical translation data leaves him open to criticism, the theory he presents has a high degree of internal consistency, which is both a strength and a limitation. We are reminded how difficult it is to build a theory that is not only internally consistent but also open to refinement (or indeed rejection) as it is tested against evidence; one that allows the generation of new ideas and hypotheses; and one that seeks not just to describe but also to explain. 
In my view, then, Catford is still an important source of ideas and insights, and well worth re-reading, albeit with a critical eye. I certainly count him among those who have influenced my own thinking about translation.
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